Abstracts – Day 1

Day 1:
Please note this list of abstracts is subject to alteration, small changes may need to be made due to unforeseen circumstances.

DRWM

Xavier Duffy, PhD Student, Birmingham University
Memorialisation of the Persian Wars: A Quantitative Analysis

This paper will address the memorialisation of the Persian Wars in fifth century BC Greece. Public monumentalisation is central to this paper as monuments are indicators of what has been deemed worthy of remembrance; they are potent markers of the collective consciousness. Memory of warfare is selective and is presented as an active cultural phenomenon. By extension, I assert that commemoration of conflict is a process of exchange, a dialogue between the present consciousness and how the past is intended to be interpreted. In analysing the public monuments erected in memory of the Persian Wars it will be possible to give a representation of their distribution over space and, with less certainty, over time. The data dealt with in this paper will be presented quantitatively. By presenting the data quantitatively, and displaying it graphically, I will highlight a number of themes present in the commemorative practices of the fifth century BC. It will be necessary to engage with the varied relationships between dedicator, object and commemorative space. In addition, the forms of commemoration and how these relate to both the chosen site of dedication and accompanying dedications in the same place will be explored. By addressing the variety of commemorative forms I draw attention to the diversity of strategies used to commemorate the Persian Wars.

Giorgia Proietti , University of Trento
The Persian Wars before Herodotus’s Histories.The fight at Psyttaleia: a trivial skirmish, or a forgotten battle?
Herodotus’ Histories actually represent the most thorough extant narrative of the Persian Wars. Before his reconstruction, nonetheless, the Persian Wars underwent a multifaceted process of memorialization: elegies, dramas, inscriptions, monuments, rites, and festivals all contributed to the shaping of pre-historiographical narratives of the Persian Wars.

Historical memory changes over time depending on the contemporary social frames and semantic needs: pre-Herodotean and Herodotean narratives about a same event can therefore differ a great deal. This is well exemplified by the development of the historical tradition about the clash fought by Greeks and Persians at the island of Psyttaleia, before the battle of Salamis.
Reduced to a trivial skirmish by Herodotus, the fight at Psyttaleia seems instead to have played a prominent role within Athenian contemporary memory, as both literary and epigraphic evidence suggest (Aeschylus’ Persians; IG I3 503/4). In Roman times, it is once again given much attention by Plutarch in his Life of Aristides, which seems to preserve hints of the pre-Herodotean stages of the tradition.
This paper explores the whole process of memorialization of Psyttaleia: why it was important in the immediate aftermath of the battle and why at a certain point it was confined to a secondary event within the Persian Wars. More specifically, it tries to show that this re-shaping of the memory of Psyttaleia was not due to ideological or propagandistic purposes (e.g. hoplitism vs naval imperialism), but to the very nature and mechanisms of collective memory.

Keynote speech:
Dr. Jon Coulson – St Andrews
‘Commemorating Conflict Landscapes in the Early 21st Century’.

Matthew Lloyd, University of Oxford
When two sites go to war: the destruction of settlements in the late eighth century BCE

At the end of the thirteenth century BCE, a wave of destructions occurred throughout Mycenaean Greece which eradicated the palatial system which had dominated in the preceding centuries, radically changing society in the Aegean. In the subsequent postpalatial period there are a number of further destructions, generally taken as indicating the instability and conflict of the time. But from the second half of the twelfth century, these stop. For around four-hundred years there is no evidence that a settlement in Greece is violently destroyed, although some are abandoned. Until, at the end of the eighth century, evidence for destruction is apparent at Lefkandi in Euboea, perhaps also Eretria, and most significantly at Asine in the Argolid. These destructions have been assimilated to literary evidence for violent conflicts in these regions: Lefkandi and Eretria become casualties of the Lelantine War; Asine is the victim of Argive expansionism against Spartan aggression. But the historical context of each of these wars has been challenged, and much of the literary evidence for them is considerably later.
This paper will re-examine the evidence for settlement destructions at Lefkandi, Eretria, and Asine in the context of late eighth-century warfare to assess how significant changes in warfare were in the development of pre-Classical Greek society. It suggests that, while violence was an important part of life in the Aegean and Ionian seas throughout the Iron Age, the destruction of Asine marks a point at which Greek warfare becomes more organized and perhaps develops a more sophisticated command structure. However, this paper will also challenge paradigms which project the hoplite phalanx back into the late eighth and early seventh centuries, taking the evidence from the Early Iron Age and early Archaic Period on its own merits, rather than relying on later testimony.

Roel Konijnendijk, PhD Student, UCL
A Poor Man’s War: Archidamos’ Strategy Against Athens

The first phase of the Peloponnesian War is usually seen as a clash between tradition and innovation – a story of naval Athens standing on its walls and laughing in the face of Sparta’s old-fashioned desire to decide the issue by hoplite battle. The Peloponnesians ravaged the land, baffled and frustrated, but the Athenians would not come out to meet them. With imported food and naval raids and overseas campaigning, they changed the face of Greek warfare forever.
Yet the Long Walls were constructed decades before the war began. As Krentz has pointed out, these walls can only have served one purpose – to facilitate an Island Strategy, by keeping the city supplied while under siege. We should therefore assume that the Spartans in 431 knew very well how Athens was planning to fight the war. They knew that ravaging their territory was unlikely to starve them into submission and might not provoke them to open battle. Why did they nonetheless insist on fighting the war in this way?
In this paper I will argue that the Peloponnesians were perfectly aware of other strategies, but did not have the means to carry them out. They could not keep their army in the field long enough to wear their enemy down; they could not raise a fleet to match that of Athens; they tried everything they could think of, but they ultimately had to rely on doing maximum damage with their land army for the short time they could afford to have it in the field. As Thucydides says, it was not tradition but a lack of money that held them back – and they were desperate to free themselves of this yoke.

Aimee Schofield: Manchester University
Mutually Assured Destruction: Heron, Ctesibius, and the rise of the catapult

The catapult, developed in around 399BC, was a weapon which had a huge impact on the way in which siege warfare developed in the fourth century and beyond. It changed the ways in cities fortified themselves against attack and compelled attacking and defending forces alike to invest in new and upgraded military technologies. This ever increasing aggression culminated in Demetrius Poliorcetes’ siege of Rhodes in 305BC, at which the defenders managed to force their opponents into a stalemate despite the huge and dramatic machines which Demetrius brought into play.
The first of our extant treatises on how to build catapults, the Belopoeica, was published around fifty years later by an Alexandrian engineer called Ctesibius. It, in turn, was republished at some point in the mid-first century AD by Heron, also from Alexandria. What part of the work are his, and which part comes directly from Ctesibius, is unclear and a matter for debate. However, the opening of the treatise presents a philosophical argument about the strategy of war which is still, to some degree, followed today.
Ctesibius, Heron, or both suggests that it is not through philosophical argument or debate that peace could be achieved between the warring Mediterranean states, but only through the equal and balanced acquisition of arms could ‘tranquillity’ or ‘calmness’ (ἀταραξία) be maintained. Part of this concept – which follows the line of si vis pacem, para bellum – is echoed in other authors, writing both before and after Ctesibius, including Thucydides, Aeneias Tacticus, Vitruvius, and Vegetius. However, this paper will argue that this passage goes beyond this point and that Heron and/or Ctesibius is making a point which is closer to our understanding of Mutually Assured Destruction.

Ben Greet, 2nd Year PhD student , Leeds University
Jupiter or Pyrrhus?: The Symbolism of the Eagle on Roman Wartime Currency in the Third Century B.C.

The eagle is one of the most recognisable symbols in Roman culture, but this association often leads to automatic, and unchallenged, assumptions on the nature of its symbolism in Roman numismatics, particularly Roman currency produced during periods of warfare. Using three examples, I would like to challenge the traditional interpretation of the eagle during this period by examining its use in the wider context of ancient Mediterranean numismatics and previous representations within Roman visual culture. The first example I will be examining is an Eagle/Pegasus aes signatum from c.280 B.C., shortly after the Punic War. The eagle has traditionally been interpreted as representing Jupiter (Crawford, 1979. Roman Republican Coinage) but looking at its wider context this is by no means certain. Instead, other interpretations are possible, for example Pyrrhus, nicknames ‘The Eagle’ and the legions, from its possible use as a standard. The second example is a Minerva/Eagle coin from c.264 B.C., the start of the First Punic War, traditionally associated with Rome’s alliance with the Mamertines. Again, the eagle’s wider symbolic context creates problems for this interpretation, especially since it ignores the implications of the eagle’s religious symbolism. The third example is a She-wolf/Eagle coin from c.217, during the Second Punic War. This coin has not received much scholarly attention, but again the eagle’s symbolism here is more complex than originally assumed. Whereas it opens the possibility of the eagle’s inclusion in Rome’s foundation myth, the wider context creates problems. Through this examination I hope to challenge not only the interpretation of the eagle on these coins, but of its assumed symbolism, and to instead use a constructed methodology of semiotics to create a definitive, yet fluid, symbolism of the eagle.

Council Chamber

Cezary Kucewicz, PhD Researcher, University College London
Honour, War and Body Parts: The mutilation of the dead in the Iliad

The attitude of ancient Greeks towards the dead could be best described in terms of respect and piety. The obligation to bury the dead was seen as one of the most powerful moral duties, constituting the key theme of many Athenian tragedies (Sophocles’ Antigone and Ajax, Euripides’ Suppliants and Trojan Women). In a similar manner, the treatment of the war dead by the Classical Greek armies was governed by a set of unwritten rules which allowed the defeated armies to retrieve and bury their dead. Any attempt at violating those rules was considered to be a serious war crime and an offence against the gods. Particularly condemned was the practice of disgracing or doing outrage to the corpse (aikia), which was widely regarded as the most unholy act. From both tragedy, and some historical accounts, we learn that maltreating the dead was a ‘practice which befitted only barbarians’; and even committed by barbarians, as Herodotus writes, the Greeks detested it (9.79). And although we hardly encounter any instances of the mutilation of the dead in Classical Greece, its prominence in Homer’s Iliad, with Achilles’ maltreatment of Hector’s body in the foreground, is puzzling, to say the least. This papers aims to address this paradox, investigating the importance of the mutilation of the dead theme in the Homeric epics and setting it in the context of the Archaic Greek concepts of honour, vengeance and death.

Nicoletta Bruno, PhD Student, Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro” and Academic Visitor Oxford University (2013-2014).
Deterrence and disgust of war. A reading of the controversial Lucr. DRN 5, 1341-1349

In a well known context of Book 5 of De rerum natura, Lucretius affirms that to ensure law and order, after the fall of the kings, much stricter laws were to be established: the violence of brutal disorder could only be erased through further violence, enforced by law which, through terror, instils the fear (metus) of punishment. Not only men would be made respectful of law by the terror of breaching it, but the fear of their opponents’ weapons, that is deterrence, could also create fear to attack the enemy, as can be read in the controversial passage 5, 1341-49. The whole passage on the development of weapons and the use of animals in warfare (1297-1349) caused long discussion among many scholars, namely Bailey 1947, who holds it as a practice of fantasy, almost an incontrovertible evidence of Lucretius’ derangement, as Jerome says. Lines 1339-1349 have been deemed as suspicious by Lachmann 1850, and by Munro 1864, who expunged them. From a more radical point of view, Deufert 1996 was certain that the passage was an interpolation. The nine lines, transmissed by main manuscripts, are in Lucretius’ peculiar style: however, that was insufficient to receive an unanimous consensus regarding its authenticity. Housman 1928, the great English classical scholar, formulated an interesting hypothesis: these lines might be a sarcastic comment made by Cicero, the first emendator of Lucretius’ works. My paper has the purpose of retreading the verses exegesis, signs of language, style and text which still make this passage hard to be considered authentic, despite Lucretius’ universal historical disgust and condemnation of military and political life and his disapproval of his contemporary age.

Dr. Jon Coulson – St Andrews
‘Commemorating Conflict Landscapes in the Early 21st Century’.

Alessandro Brambilla, PhD student, Università degli studi di Roma, Tor Vergata
“ὁπλῖται δὲ πλείους ἢ μύριοι”. Mobilization potential and proportional distribution of federal commitments in Boeotia and Thessaly.

Despite the opinion widespread among scholars which identifies in the huge recruitment potential one of the main advantages of the federal union in ancient Greece, a detailed analysis of the sources may provide a picture of the facts not entirely consistent with this view. Starting from the analysis of the entities which are better known to moderns, the koinon of the Boeotians and the koinon of the Thessalians, it is possible to demonstrate that the mobilization potential of a Greek federal state was undoubtedly good, but not outstanding if compared with that of certain poleis. This circumstance seems to be surprising when compared with the demographic potential that these realities were actually able to express, certainly greater than the one of a single city. The reason for this discrepancy could lie in the principle of proportional distribution of the federal commitments between individual members which inspired the constitutions of these states and which was implemented through the creation of a districts system. Although this principle, at least in theory, seems conceived as an element aimed to guarantee representation in the decision-making bodies of smaller members, which could share the burdens without suffering excessive detriment in their chances of self-defence, on the other hand it would appear to constitute a restriction for the complete deployment of the military potential of these states.

Elizabeth Pearson, PhD Student, University of Manchester
In Capitolio?: The Location of the Republican Dilectus

In the sixth book of his Histories, Polybius gives a description of the Roman dilectus (military levy) during the Mid-Republic (6.19-26). He states that the levy is held in Rome on the Capitol with the entire eligible male citizen body present. This narrative has been dismissed by modern scholars such as Frank Walbank and Peter Brunt as both implausible and anachronistic, not only for the 160s-150s BC when Polybius was writing but even for the point in his narrative at which it occurs, after the Battle of Cannae in 216. Instead, Polybius is considered to have been mistaken or to be reflecting a much more ancient practice no longer followed. A decentralised levy process is considered more plausible.
It is the contention of this paper that such dismissal of Polybius’ account is unwarranted, Using topographical and demographic methods it will be demonstrated that it is possible that the dilectus could have been held solely on the Capitol in both the late third and mid second century. The physical space on the Capitol will be examined, along with the portion of the population to be considered as the ‘eligible male citizen body’, to reach the conclusion that this body of men could have gathered on the Capitol with enough space to effectively carry out the levy. Finally, in the light of this acceptance of Polybius’ account, mentions of the levy by Livy will be briefly re-examined in order to demonstrate that not only was it possible for the dilectus to be held on the Capitol, but also that the literary evidence points to just such an interpretation.

Liam Gale, PhD Student, Edinburgh University
Mercenaries or Allies? A re-evaluation of the military role played by the Galatians during the Hellenistic period.

In the eyes of the Greeks and Romans, the Gauls who settled in central Anatolia were, above all else, warriors. This perception dominates in the primary sources and has understandably created a military-first approach to how we view the Galatians. The military relationship between the Greeks and the Galatians provides a window through which we can better explore and understand their place in the Hellenistic world. Modern scholarship has traditionally viewed the Galatians as mercenaries, and thus, as apolitical players in the political landscape of the Hellenistic world. This is however both highly misleading and unfaithful to the primary sources. I will ague that the Galatians had far more political and military agency than they have previously been credited. Assuming the Galatians primarily played the role of mercenaries detracts from scholars’ ability to view them as a dynamic and political force and instead, assigns to them the place of an inconsequential power. Rather than presenting the Galatians as mercenaries, the primary sources may instead portray them as allies when fighting alongside the Hellenistic kings. Furthermore if we accept that the Galatians were primarily allies, then they must have wielded far more political power in Asia Minor than has previously been believed and had the diplomatic ability and will to navigate the complexities of Hellenistic diplomacy. This paper will also investigate how and why this view arose, and the effect it has had on modern scholarship.

Tristan Herzogenrath-Amelung , PhD Student, University of Edinburgh
Naval Hoplites: The Social Status of Athenian epibatai

This paper will explore the social background of Classical Athenian epibatai, dedicated naval infantry who served on triremes. It will be argued that the common view, viz. that epibatai were usually recruited from Athens’ lowest property class, the thetes, and had a commensurate social standing, needs to be adjusted, as it rests almost entirely on two sentences in Thucydides (6.43 and 8.24), and ignores other evidence that in fact suggests that epibatai were drawn not from the thetes, but from the upper three tiers of Athenian society: the zeugitai, hippeis, and pentakosiomedimnoi; incidentally this is the same recruitment pool as that of regular hoplites for land operations, which fits well with our sources using the words “epibatai” and “hoplites” interchangeably. To illustrate this, we will begin with a brief outline of naval warfare in general, highlighting the continued importance of naval infantry, and then look at several passages that confirm the prestige associated with service as an epibates. A short concluding section will then relate our findings to the wider debates about hoplite warfare, especially regarding a hoplite’s ability to fight as a soloist.